Merge pull request #772 from Nikoleta-v3/strategies_documentation

More strategies documentation

Author: drvinceknight

axelrod/strategies/adaptive.py

@@ -5,7 +5,13 @@
 
 class Adaptive(Player):
     """Start with a specific sequence of C and D, then play the strategy that
-    has worked best, recalculated each turn."""
+    has worked best, recalculated each turn.
+
+    Names:
+
+    - Adaptive: [Li2011]_
+
+    """
 
     name = 'Adaptive'
     classifier = {

axelrod/strategies/grudger.py

@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ class Grudger(Player):
     - Grudger: [Li2011]_
     - Grim: [Berg2015]_
     - Grim Trigger: [Banks1980]_
+    - Spite: [Beaufils1997]_
     """
 
     name = 'Grudger'

axelrod/strategies/handshake.py

@@ -5,7 +5,12 @@
 
 class Handshake(Player):
     """Starts with C, D. If the opponent plays the same way, cooperate forever,
-    else defect forever."""
+    else defect forever.
+
+    Names:
+
+    - Handshake: [Robson1989]_
+    """
 
     name = 'Handshake'
     classifier = {

axelrod/strategies/memoryone.py

@@ -100,10 +100,9 @@ def __init__(self, initial=C):
 class WinShiftLoseStay(MemoryOnePlayer):
     """Win-Shift Lose-Stay, also called Reverse Pavlov.
 
-    For reference see: "Engineering Design of Strategies for Winning
-    Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma Competitions" by Jiawei Li, Philip Hingston,
-    and Graham Kendall.  IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTATIONAL INTELLIGENCE AND AI
-    IN GAMES, VOL. 3, NO. 4, DECEMBER 2011
+    Names:
+
+    - WSLS: [Li2011]_
     """
 
     name = 'Win-Shift Lose-Stay'
@@ -125,7 +124,12 @@ def __init__(self, initial=D):
 
 
 class GTFT(MemoryOnePlayer):
-    """Generous Tit-For-Tat Strategy."""
+    """Generous Tit For Tat Strategy.
+
+    Names:
+
+    - Generous Tit For Tat: [Nowak1993]_
+    """
 
     name = 'GTFT'
     classifier = {
@@ -165,8 +169,12 @@ def __repr__(self):
 
 
 class FirmButFair(MemoryOnePlayer):
-    """A Classical Strategy described in this paper (and earlier):
-    http://www.math.ubc.ca/~hauert/publications/reprints/hauert_jtb02b.pdf"""
+    """A strategy that cooperates on the first move, and cooperates except after receiving a
+    sucker payoff.
+
+    Names:
+
+    - Firm But Fair: [Frean1994]_"""
 
     name = 'Firm But Fair'
 

axelrod/strategies/rand.py

@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ class Random(Player):
     Names:
 
     - Random: [Axelrod1980]_
+    - Lunatic: [Tzafestas2000]_
     """
 
     name = 'Random'

axelrod/strategies/titfortat.py

@@ -156,6 +156,7 @@ class SuspiciousTitForTat(Player):
     Names:
 
     - Suspicious Tit For Tat: [Hilde2013]_
+    - Mistrust: [Beaufils1997]_
     """
 
     name = "Suspicious Tit For Tat"

docs/reference/bibliography.rst

@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ documentation.
 .. [Banks1980] Banks, J. S., & Sundaram, R. K. (1990). Repeated games, finite automata, and complexity. Games and Economic Behavior, 2(2), 97–117.  http://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90024-O
 .. [Beaufils1997] Beaufils, B. and Delahaye, J. (1997). Our Meeting With Gradual: A Good Strategy For The Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/summary?doi=10.1.1.42.4041
 .. [Berg2015] Berg, P. Van Den, & Weissing, F. J. (2015). The importance of mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation. Proceedings of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences, 282.
+.. [Frean1994] Frean, Marcus R. “The Prisoner's Dilemma without Synchrony.” Proceedings: Biological Sciences, vol. 257, no. 1348, 1994, pp. 75–79. www.jstor.org/stable/50253.
 .. [Hilde2013] Hilbe, C., Nowak, M.A. and Traulsen, A. (2013). Adaptive dynamics of extortion and compliance, PLoS ONE, 8(11), p. e77886. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0077886.
 .. [Kraines1989] Kraines, D. & Kraines, V. Theor Decis (1989) 26: 47.  doi:10.1007/BF00134056
 .. [Li2011] Li, J., Hingston, P., Member, S., & Kendall, G. (2011). Engineering Design of Strategies for Winning Iterated Prisoner ’ s Dilemma Competitions, 3(4), 348–360.
@@ -22,6 +23,7 @@ documentation.
 .. [Nowak1993] Nowak, M., & Sigmund, K. (1993). A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner’s Dilemma game. Nature, 364(6432), 56–58. http://doi.org/10.1038/364056a0
 .. [Press2012] Press, W. H., & Dyson, F. J. (2012). Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma contains strategies that dominate any evolutionary opponent. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(26), 10409–10413.  http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1206569109
 .. [PRISON1998] LIFL (1998) PRISON. Available at: http://www.lifl.fr/IPD/ipd.frame.html (Accessed: 19 September 2016).
+.. [Robson1989] Robson, Arthur, (1989), EFFICIENCY IN EVOLUTIONARY GAMES: DARWIN, NASH AND SECRET HANDSHAKE, Working Papers, Michigan - Center for Research on Economic & Social Theory, http://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:fth:michet:89-22.
 .. [Singer-Clark2014] Singer-Clark, T. (2014). Morality Metrics On Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Players.
 .. [Slany2007] Slany W. and Kienreich W., On some winning strategies for the iterated prisoner’s dilemma, in Kendall G., Yao X. and Chong S. (eds.) The iterated prisoner’s dilemma: 20 years on. World Scientific, chapter 8, pp. 171-204, 2007.
 .. [Stewart2012] Stewart, a. J., & Plotkin, J. B. (2012). Extortion and cooperation in the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(26), 10134–10135. http://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.1208087109